Runoff vs. Plurality: Does It Matter for Expenditures? Evidence from Italy
Davide Cipullo ()
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Davide Cipullo: Department of Economics, Postal: Department of Economics, Uppsala University, P.O. Box 513, SE-751 20 Uppsala, Sweden
No 2018:13, Working Paper Series from Uppsala University, Department of Economics
This paper compares the runoff system and the plurality rule in terms of the size and composition of public expenditures. I use the change in the voting rule in Italian municipalities at 15,000 residents to implement a regression discontinuity design. The results show that municipalities under the runoff system spend at least 20 percent more than those under the plurality rule, and that this effect is primarily driven by a large increase in administrative spending. Additionally, the greater number of candidates and the larger coalitions indicate lower accountability under the runoff system than under the plurality rule.
Keywords: Voting rules; Fiscal policy; Runoff; Plurality; Regression discontinuity design (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D72 E02 H39 H50 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-eur and nep-mac
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hhs:uunewp:2018_013
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