Quantity Choice in Unit Price Contract Procurements

Svante Mandell and Fredrik Brunes ()
Additional contact information
Fredrik Brunes: KTH, Postal: Department of Real Estate and Construction Management, KTH, Brinellvägen 1, 100 44 STOCKHOLM, Sweden, http://www.kth.se/abe

No 2011:4, Working Papers from Swedish National Road & Transport Research Institute (VTI)

Abstract: A common approach for procuring large construction projects is through Unit Price Contracts. By the means of a simple model, we study the optimal quantity to procure under uncertainty regarding the actual required quantity given that the procurer strives to minimize expected total costs. The model shows that the quantity to procure in optimum follows from a trade-off between the risk of having to pay for more units than actually necessary and of having to conduct costly renegotiations. The optimal quantity increases in costs associated with possible renegotiations, decreases in expected per unit price, and, if a renegotiation does not increase per unit price too much, decreases in the uncertainty surrounding the actual quantity required.

Keywords: Unit price contracts; procurement; construction (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D44 H54 H57 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 17 pages
Date: 2011-02-15
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-ppm
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.transportportal.se/SWoPEc/Quantity_in_UPC_(Mandell_Brunes).pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Quantity Choice in Unit Price Contract Procurements (2014)
Working Paper: Quantity Choice in Unit Price Contract Procurements (2013)
Working Paper: Quantity choice in unit price contract procurements (2011)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hhs:vtiwps:2011_004

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