EconPapers    
Economics at your fingertips  
 

Conditional Cash Transfers, Civil Conflict and Insurgent Influence: Experimental Evidence from the Philippines

Benjamin Crost, Joseph Felter () and Patrick Johnston ()
Additional contact information
Joseph Felter: Stanford University
Patrick Johnston: RAND Corporation

No 174, HiCN Working Papers from Households in Conflict Network

Abstract: Conditional cash transfer (CCT) programs are an increasingly popular tool for reducing poverty in conflict-affected areas. Despite their growing popularity, there is limited evidence on how CCT programs affect conflict and theoretical predictions are ambiguous. We estimate the effect of conditional cash transfers on civil conflict in the Philippines by exploiting an experiment that randomly assigned eligibility for a CCT program at the village level. We find that cash transfers caused a substantial decrease in conflict-related incidents in treatment villages relative to control villages. Using unique data on local insurgent influence, we also find that the program significantly reduced insurgent influence in treated villages.

Pages: 31 pages
Date: 2014-04
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-dem, nep-dev, nep-exp, nep-ltv and nep-sea
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (7)

Downloads: (external link)
https://hicn.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/06/HiCN-WP-174.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Conditional cash transfers, civil conflict and insurgent influence: Experimental evidence from the Philippines (2016) Downloads
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hic:wpaper:174

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in HiCN Working Papers from Households in Conflict Network
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Tilman Brück () and () and () and ().

 
Page updated 2025-03-30
Handle: RePEc:hic:wpaper:174