From Salary to the Performance-Based Remuneration of Russian Physicians: How Motivation at Work is Changing
Sergey Shishkin () and
Aleksandr Temnitsky ()
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Aleksandr Temnitsky: National Research University Higher School of Economics
No WP BRP 08/PSP/2017, HSE Working papers from National Research University Higher School of Economics
This paper examines changes in the motivation of physicians at work since the start of the salary reforms in 2008. These reforms included a shift from a fixed salary system to performance-based remuneration and an overall increase in salaries. The data of six surveys of health workers from 2007–2016 were used to reveal physician’s motives at work and to track the changes during this period. The changes were minor, and the directions of these changes were contrary to the expected strengthening of financial motivation at work: the importance of earning money is no longer primary. The share of doctors willing to work more and better on the condition of linking salary with labour contribution did not increase. In contrast, almost 66% of physicians believe that they are working at a high level of quality and performance.The majority of physicians desire an increase in the base salary, not the performance-based part. Doctors who receive bonuses for the intensity, quality and performance of their work, and those who have a higher salary overall also wish to see a higher base salary. This is a clear indication that they wish to strengthen the protective function of the base salary rather than to have increased opportunities for earning money
Keywords: health care; physicians; salary; performance based remuneration; motivation at work; incentives. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: I18 J08 J31 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cis, nep-hea and nep-hrm
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Published in WP BRP Series: Public and Social Policy / PSP, March 2017, pages 1-25
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hig:wpaper:08/psp/2017
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