Excess Values for Cooperative Games with Transferable Utilities and Double Consistent Allocation Methods

Elena Yanovskaya

HSE Working papers from National Research University Higher School of Economics

Abstract: For cooperative games with transferable utilities (TU games) excess functions e : R2 ! R1 whose values e(x(S); v(S)); S N are relative negative utilities of coalitions S with respect to their payo s x(S) = Pi2S xi are de ned. The excess values for the class of two-person games are de ned as those giving to both players equal excess values. An extension of this de nition to the class of all TU games is given. For surplus sharing problems as a particular class of TU games, the excess values turned out to be parametric methods which are allocation-consistent. However, allocation consistency may not coincide with game theoretic consistency on the class of surplus sharing problems. Necessary and sucient conditions on the excess functions under which both de nitions of consistency { for the allocation methods and for TU game solutions { coincide on the class of surplus sharing problems are given.

Keywords: Allocation problem; Allocation method; Surplus sharing problem; TU game solution; Excess function; Excess value; Consistency (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C71 D63 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 29 pages
Date: 2011
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Published in WP BRP Series: Economics / EC, December 2011, pages 1-29

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