Economics at your fingertips  

Team Vs. Individual Tournaments: Evidence From Prize Structure In Esports

Dennis Coates () and Petr Parshakov ()

No WP BRP 138/EC/2016, HSE Working papers from National Research University Higher School of Economics

Abstract: This study tests the implications of tournament theory using data on eSports (video game) competitions. We incorporate team production with the theory of rank order elimination tournaments since in our analysis, competitors in an elimination tournament are groups rather than individuals. In this setting, the issue of proper incentives becomes more complicated than in the normal tournament model. Our findings demonstrate that the prize structure is convex in rank order which means that the contestants in eSports tournaments are risk averse. The results for the team games are more consistent with the tournament theory than the results for individual games. From the practical point of view, we provide decision-makers in both sports and business with the insights about the compensation design with respect to importance of the competition and its type.

Keywords: tournament theory; eSports; video games; team production. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: Z20 J3 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth, nep-hrm and nep-spo
Date: 2016
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2) Track citations by RSS feed

Published in WP BRP Series: Economics / EC, June 2016, pages 1-20

Downloads: (external link) (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link:

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in HSE Working papers from National Research University Higher School of Economics Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Shamil Abdulaev ().

Page updated 2019-06-10
Handle: RePEc:hig:wpaper:138/ec/2016