On the Dilution of Market Power
Mathieu Parenti (),
Jacques Thisse () and
Philip Ushchev ()
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Mathieu Parenti: National Research University Higher School of Economics
No WP BRP 176/EC/2017, HSE Working papers from National Research University Higher School of Economics
We show that a market involving a handful of large-scale firms and a myriad of small-scale firms may give rise to different types of market structure, ranging from monopoly or oligopoly to monopolistic competition through new types of market structure. In particular, we find conditions under which the free entry and exit of small firms incentivizes big firms to sell their varieties at the monopolistically competitive prices, behaving as if in monopolistic competition. We call this result the dilution of market power. The structure of preferences is the main driver for a specific market structure to emerge as an equilibrium outcome
Keywords: dominant rms; monopolistically competitive fringe; monopolistic competition; oligopoly; contestability. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D43 F12 L13 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com and nep-ind
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Published in WP BRP Series: Economics / EC, October 2017, pages 1-32
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Working Paper: On the Dilution of Market Power (2017)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hig:wpaper:176/ec/2017
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