On the Dilution of Market Power

Sergey Kokovin, Mathieu Parenti (), Jacques Thisse and Philip Ushchev

HSE Working papers from National Research University Higher School of Economics

Abstract: We show that a market involving a handful of large-scale firms and a myriad of small-scale firms may give rise to different types of market structure, ranging from monopoly or oligopoly to monopolistic competition through new types of market structure. In particular, we find conditions under which the free entry and exit of small firms incentivizes big firms to sell their varieties at the monopolistically competitive prices, behaving as if in monopolistic competition. We call this result the dilution of market power. The structure of preferences is the main driver for a specific market structure to emerge as an equilibrium outcome

Keywords: dominant rms; monopolistically competitive fringe; monopolistic competition; oligopoly; contestability. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D43 F12 L13 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 32 pages
Date: 2017
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com and nep-ind
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

Published in WP BRP Series: Economics / EC, October 2017, pages 1-32

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Working Paper: On the Dilution of Market Power (2017)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hig:wpaper:176/ec/2017

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