About the Looking Forward Approach in Cooperative Differential Games with Transferable Utility
Ovanes Petrosian ()
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Ovanes Petrosian: National Research University Higher School of Economics
No WP BRP 183/EC/2018, HSE Working papers from National Research University Higher School of Economics
This paper presents a complete description and the results of the Looking Forward Approach for cooperative differential games with transferable utility. The approach is used for constructing game theoretical models and defining solutions for conflict-controlled processes where information about the process updates dynamically or for differential games with dynamic updating. It is supposed that players lack certain information about the dynamical system and payoff function over the whole time interval on which the game is played. At each instant, information about the game structure updates, players receive new updated information about the dynamical system and payoff functions. A resource extraction game serves as an illustration in order to compare a cooperative trajectory, imputations, and the imputation distribution procedure in a game with the Looking Forward Approach and in the original game with a prescribed duration.
Keywords: Differential Games; Cooperative Differential Games; Looking Forward Approach; Time Consistency; Strong Time Consistency. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C71 C73 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth and nep-upt
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Published in WP BRP Series: Economics / EC, February 2018, pages 1-35
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hig:wpaper:183/ec/2018
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