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Cooperative congestion games

Vasily Gusev ()
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Vasily Gusev: National Research University Higher School of Economics

HSE Working papers from National Research University Higher School of Economics

Abstract: This paper studies a model for cooperative congestion games. There is an array of cooperative games V and a player’s strategy is to choose a subset of the set V. The player gets a certain payoff from each chosen game. The paper demonstrates that if a payoff is the Shapley or the Banzhaf value, then the corresponding cooperative congestion game has a Nash equilibrium in pure strategies. The case is examined where each game in V has a coalition partition. The stability of the vector of coalition structures is determined, taking in to account the transitions of players with in a game and their migrations to other games. The potential function is defined for coalition partitions, and is used as a means of proving the existence of a stable vector of coalition structures for a certain class of cooperative game values.

Keywords: potential games; Nash stability; coalition structure; congestion games (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C60 C62 C71 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 19 pages
Date: 2021
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth
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Published in WP BRP Series: Economics / EC, April 2021, pages 1-19

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hig:wpaper:245/ec/2021

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