The Determinants of Faculty Pay in Russian Universities: Incentive Contracts
Ilya Prakhov () and
Victor Rudakov ()
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Ilya Prakhov: National Research University Higher School of Economics
Victor Rudakov: National Research University Higher School of Economics
No WP BRP 47/EDU/2018, HSE Working papers from National Research University Higher School of Economics
This paper evaluates the design of current contractual incentive mechanisms in Russian universities depending on the type of higher education institution after recent significant contractual reforms in the national academic sector. We employ the theoretical framework of incentive contracts in order to identify and assess performance measures of university faculty determining the total income received from teaching, research and administrative duties. We estimate returns from academic productivity in Russia to be reflected in the academic salary by an evaluation of empirical models of the determinants of faculty pay depending on their productivity, current academic and administrative position, gender and seniority. We show that for the entire sample, faculty salary is positively associated with publication activity. Teaching is significant only for the entire sample, but not significant for subsamples. Administrative duties (expressed in the position held) are positively related to faculty pay: the largest effect is for rectors and vice-rectors, but for deans and heads of departments or laboratories the effect is also strong. Heads of universities and structural units receive a significant bonus for their administrative position. For research-oriented universities the largest effect in publication activity is for the number of papers in high ranking journals. In universities with no research status we discovered a significant gender gap: the male faculty earn more than their female colleagues. There is a positive linear relationship between salary and seniority for the entire sample and in universities with no special status, which corresponds to human capital theory. Salaries in universities requiring higher entrance exam scores are higher than in less selective higher education institutions. The salary in Moscow universities is higher than in the regional higher education institutions.
Keywords: academic contracts; faculty pay; merit pay; incentive contract; international rankings; competitiveness of higher education. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: I21 I23 J31 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cis, nep-cse, nep-cta, nep-hrm, nep-lma, nep-sog and nep-tra
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Published in WP BRP Series: Education / EDU, September 2018, pages 1-30
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hig:wpaper:47edu2018
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