What is the socially desirable formation of environmental R&D?
Yasunori Ouchida () and
Daisaku Goto ()
No 2-6, IDEC DP2 Series from Hiroshima University, Graduate School for International Development and Cooperation (IDEC)
This paper presents an examination of the socially desirable formation of environmental R&D in Cournot duopoly in a setting where a regulator has no precommitment ability for an emissions tax. The results reveal that if environmental damage is sufficiently small, alternatively if there is severe environmental damage and large inefficiency in environmental R&D costs, then environmental research joint venture (ERJV) carteliza- tion is socially desirable. However, if environmental damage is sufficiently extensive, and if a firm’s environmental R&D costs are sufficiently limited, then, in contrast to previous studies, environmental R&D competition is socially more desirable than environmental R&D cartelization and ERJV cartelization, although R&D competition is the case of “NO information sharing” and “NO R&D coordination.”
Keywords: Environmental research joint venture; Environmental R&D; Time-consistent emission tax; Competition policy; Cournot duopoly (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: O32 L13 Q55 Q58 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 19 pages
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hir:idecdp:2-6
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