Cournot duopoly and environmental R&D under regulator’s precommitment to an emissions tax
Yasunori Ouchida () and
Daisaku Goto ()
No 4-3, IDEC DP2 Series from Hiroshima University, Graduate School for International Development and Cooperation (IDEC)
This paper presents examination of environmental R&D of Cournot duopolists with end-of-pipe technology under a regulator’s precommitment to an emissions tax. Results show that, in the presence of technological spillover effect, the government invariably prefers environmental R&D cartelization to environmental R&D competition. In addition, this paper, in stark contrast to those presenting earlier studies, reveals that consumer surplus is not necessarily maximized by environmental research joint venture (ERJV) cartelization, although there invariably exist private incentives to firms for ERJV cartelization as well as social incentives for it.
Keywords: R&D coordination; Environmental R&D; End-of-pipe technology; Precommit- ment ability; Emission tax (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: O32 L13 Q55 Q58 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 11 pages
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com, nep-ene, nep-env, nep-ino and nep-res
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http://ir.lib.hiroshima-u.ac.jp/files/public/35705 ... 05/IDEC-DP2_04-3.pdf First version, 2014 (application/pdf)
Journal Article: Cournot duopoly and environmental R&D under regulator’s precommitment to an emissions tax (2016)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hir:idecdp:4-3
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