Gender Occupational Segregation in an Equilibrium Search Model
No 560, CIS Discussion paper series from Center for Intergenerational Studies, Institute of Economic Research, Hitotsubashi University
This paper develops an equilibrium search model to explain gender asymmetry in occupational distribution. Workers’ utility depends on salary and working hours, and women have a greater aversion to market hours than men. Simulations indicate that women crowd into shorter-hour, lower-paying jobs than men. If employers discriminate against women, offers are tailored more toward men’s preferences; employers require longer working hours, and fewer women work at these jobs. Similarly, if women have a disutility factor in their utility toward positions with a higher proportion of men, fewer women work at these jobs. In both cases, gender segregation is reinforced
Keywords: Equilibrium Search; Gender preferences; Employer discrimination; Employee discrimination (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: E24 J16 J64 J71 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-dem, nep-dge and nep-lab
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hit:cisdps:560
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