The Stationary Equilibrium of Three-Person Cooperative Games: A Classification
No 2012-06, Discussion Papers from Graduate School of Economics, Hitotsubashi University
We present a classification of all stationary subgame perfect equilibria of the random proposer model for a three-person cooperative game according to the level of efficiency. The efficiency level is characterized by the number of "central" players who join all equilibrium coalitions. The existence of a central player guarantees asymptotic efficiency. The marginal contributions of players to the grand coalition play a critical role in their expected equilibrium payoffs.
Keywords: cooperative game; noncooperative bargaining; three-person game; random proposer; core; marginal contribution (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C71 C72 C78 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth, nep-hpe and nep-mic
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hit:econdp:2012-06
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