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Natural implementation with semi-responsible agents in pure exchange economies

Michele Lombardi and Naoki Yoshihara ()

No HIAS-E-48, Discussion paper series from Hitotsubashi Institute for Advanced Study, Hitotsubashi University

Abstract: We study Nash implementation by natural price-quantity mechanisms in pure exchange economies when agents have intrinsic preferences for responsibility. An agent has an intrinsic preference for responsibility if she cares about truth-telling that is in line with the goal of the mechanism designer besides her material well-being. A semi-responsible agent is an agent who, given what her opponents do, acts in an irresponsible manner when a responsible behavior poses obstacles to her material well-being. The class of efficient allocation rules that are Nash implementable is identified provided that there is at least one agent who is semi-responsible. The Walrasian rule is shown to belong to that class.

Keywords: Nash equilibrium; exchange economies; intrinsic preferences for responsibility; boundary problem; price-quantity mechanism (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D71 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 22 p.
Date: 2016-12
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-des, nep-gth and nep-mic
References: View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1) Track citations by RSS feed

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http://hermes-ir.lib.hit-u.ac.jp/hermes/ir/re/28679/070_hiasDP-E-48.pdf

Related works:
Journal Article: Natural implementation with semi-responsible agents in pure exchange economies (2017) Downloads
Working Paper: Natural implementation with semi-responsible agents in pure exchange economies (2017) Downloads
Working Paper: Natural implementation with semi-responsible agents in pure exchange economies (2017) Downloads
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hit:hiasdp:hias-e-48

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