Robust Voting under Uncertainty
Satoshi Nakada,
Shmuel Nitzan,
Takashi Ui and
貴志 宇井
No HIAS-E-60, Discussion paper series from Hitotsubashi Institute for Advanced Study, Hitotsubashi University
Abstract:
This paper proposes normative consequentialist criteria for voting rules under Knightian uncertainty about individual preferences to characterize a weighted majority rule (WMR). The criteria stress the significance of responsiveness, i.e., the probability that the social outcome coincides with the realized individual preferences. A voting rule is said to be robust if, for any probability distribution of preferences, responsiveness of at least one individual is greater than one-half. Our main result establishes that a voting rule is robust if and only if it is a WMR without ties. This characterization of a WMR avoiding the worst possible outcomes complements the well-known characterization of a WMR achieving the optimal outcomes, i.e., efficiency regarding responsiveness.
Keywords: majority rule; weighted majority rule; responsiveness; Knightian uncertainty (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D71 D81 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 22 pages
Date: 2017-12
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-des, nep-mic, nep-pol and nep-upt
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)
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https://hermes-ir.lib.hit-u.ac.jp/hermes/ir/re/28978/070_hiasDP-E-60.pdf
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hit:hiasdp:hias-e-60
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