The Determinants of Executive Compensation in Japan and the UK: Agency Hypothesis or Joint Determination Hypothesis?

Katsuyuki Kubo, 克行 久保 and カツユキ クボ

No 2001-2, CEI Working Paper Series from Center for Economic Institutions, Institute of Economic Research, Hitotsubashi University

Abstract: Although there are many studies on executive compensation, many of these studies often take for granted the 'Anglo-American style of corporate governance'. This paper seeks to contrast the effect of corporate governance on the directors' incentive, by comparing the UK and Japan. There is a positive and significant relationship between directors' pay and employees' average wage in Japan, suggesting that both directors and employees have a similar incentive system while no such relationship is observed in the UK. These results suggest that the difference in corporate governance affects the director's salary and their incentives.

Keywords: Executive Compensation; Corporate Governance; Company performance; Japan; UK (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: G30 J33 L20 M10 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 36 pages
Date: 2001-02
Note: February 2001
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (8)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hit:hitcei:2001-2

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