Behavioural Biases of Japanese Institutional Investors; Fund management and Corporate Governance

Megumi Suto, 惠 首藤, メグミ ストウ, Masashi Toshino, 雅司 俊野 and マサシ トシノ

No 2004-12, CEI Working Paper Series from Center for Economic Institutions, Institute of Economic Research, Hitotsubashi University

Abstract: This study examines the behavioural biases of Japanese institutional investors and discusses implications for their role in corporate governance, based on the findings of a questionnaire survey of fund managers carried out in 2003. Statistical analysis of the survey results reveals a short-term bias in fund managers' investment time horizons, herding, and self-marketing to improve the appearance of portfolio performance under the pressure either of customers or of institutional restraints. We conclude that institutional investors' behaviour contradicts their role as shareholders.

Keywords: Institutional investors; fund management; investment time horizon; herding; self-marketing; corporate governance (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 22 pages
Date: 2004-07
Note: 2nd International Conference on Corporate Governance: Effective Directors and Responsible Investors, June 29, 2004: Corporate Governance Centre Birmingham Business School, University of Birmingham
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https://hermes-ir.lib.hit-u.ac.jp/hermes/ir/re/13911/wp2004-12a.pdf

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hit:hitcei:2004-12

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