Business Groups and Tunneling: Evidence from Private Securities Offerings by Korean Chaebols
Jae-Seung Baek,
Jun-Koo Kang and
Inmoo Lee
No 2004-6, CEI Working Paper Series from Center for Economic Institutions, Institute of Economic Research, Hitotsubashi University
Abstract:
Using a comprehensive sample of equity-linked private securities offerings by Korean firms from 1989 to 2000, we examine whether such offerings can be used as a mechanism for wealth transfer between issuers and acquirers. For deals involving issuers and acquirers in the same business group (chaebol), the announcement returns for chaebol-affiliated issuers with good past performance are lower than those for other types of issuers if the price discount is larger. In contrast, this deal leads to more value creation for chaebol-affiliated acquirers than other types of acquirers. Furthermore, well-performing chaebol-affiliated acquirers experience a larger wealth loss than other types of acquirers if they buy securities from poorly performing issuers in the same chaebol. We also find that chaebol firms with good past performance tend to sell private securities at a low price to their member firms. This evidence is consistent with tunneling within business groups.
Pages: 45 pages
Date: 2004-03
Note: This version: January 2004
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:
Downloads: (external link)
https://hermes-ir.lib.hit-u.ac.jp/hermes/ir/re/13930/wp2004-6a.pdf
Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
HTML/Text
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hit:hitcei:2004-6
Access Statistics for this paper
More papers in CEI Working Paper Series from Center for Economic Institutions, Institute of Economic Research, Hitotsubashi University Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Reiko Suzuki ( this e-mail address is bad, please contact ).