Endogenous board formation and its determinants in a transition economy: evidence from Russia

Ichiro Iwasaki, 一郎 岩﨑 and イチロウ イワサキ

No 2007-1, CEI Working Paper Series from Center for Economic Institutions, Institute of Economic Research, Hitotsubashi University

Abstract: Using a unique dataset of joint-stock companies in Russia, we studied the endogenous formation of corporate boards and its determinants. The findings reported in this paper strongly suggest that the theories and empirical methods of financial and organizational economics help accurately pinpoint the determinants of board size, proportion of outsider directors, and outsideness of chairman appointment of Russian firms. We also found that their board structure can be reasonably explained by the bargaining hypothesis. Furthermore, our empirical evidence demonstrated that Russia’s legal system and peculiarities as a transition economy also have a great deal of influence in determining board formation.

Keywords: board formation; endogeneity; agency theory; bargaining model; Russia (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D21 D23 G34 K22 L22 P31 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 50 pages
Date: 2007-10
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-tra
Note: First Draft: January, 2007 Current Version: October, 2007
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hit:hitcei:2007-1

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