Welfarist-Consequentialism, Similarity of Attitudes and Arrow's Gerneral Impossibility Theorem

Kotaro Suzumura and Yongsheng Xu

Discussion Paper Series from Institute of Economic Research, Hitotsubashi University

Abstract: Two features of Arrow's social choice theory are critically scrutinized. The first feature is the welfarist-consequentialism, which not only bases social judgements about right or wrong actions on the assessment of their consequences, but also assesses consequences in terms of people's welfare and nothing else. The second feature is a similarity of people's attitudes towards social outcomes as a possible resolvent of the Arrow impossibility theorem. Two extended frameworks, one consequentialist and the other non-consequentialist, are developed. Both frameworks are shown to admit some interesting resolutions of Arrow's general impossibility theorem, which are rather sharply contrasting with Arrow's own perspective.

JEL-codes: D63 D71 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1999-03
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Welfarist-consequentialism, similarity of attitudes, and Arrow’s general impossibility theorem (2004)
Working Paper: Welfarist-Consequentialism, Similarity of Attitudes and Arrow's Gerneral Impossibility Theorem (2000)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hit:hituec:a366

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