Characterizations of Bargaining Solutions in Production Economies with Unequal Skills

Naoki Yoshihara ()

Discussion Paper Series from Institute of Economic Research, Hitotsubashi University

Abstract: In production economies with unequal skills, this paper characterizes bargaining solutions by using axioms on allocation rules rather than axioms on classical bargaining solutions. Instead of Consistency of Resource Allocation across Dimension (CONRAD)[Roemer (1986, 1988)], which is essentially equivalent to the axiom of Welrfarism [Roemer (1988)], we introduce a weaker axiom, Consistency w.r.t. Technological Innovations (CTI), so that the non-welfaristic characterizations of bargaining solutions in the production economies are provided. By the characterizations, we can classify the three bargaining solutions (the Nash, the Kalai-Smorodinsky, and the Egalitarian solutions)from the viewpoint of responsibility and compensation discussed by Dwokin (1981, 1981a).

JEL-codes: D63 D71 I31 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2000-10
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Journal Article: Characterizations of bargaining solutions in production economies with unequal skills (2003)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hit:hituec:a396

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