Nonconvex bargaining problems

Yongsheng Xu, Naoki Yoshihara (), 直毅 吉原 and ナオキ ヨシハラ

No a454, Discussion Paper Series from Institute of Economic Research, Hitotsubashi University

Abstract: This paper studies compact and comprehensive bargaining problems for n players and axiomatically characterize the extensions of the three classical bargaining solutions to nonconvex bargaining problems: the Nash solution, the egalitarian solution and the Kalai-Smorodinsky solution. Our characterizing axioms are various extensions of Nash's original axioms.

Pages: 14 pages
Date: 2004-07
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-reg
Note: 38047, Bibliography: p. 12-13
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hit:hituec:a454

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