Extended Social Ordering Functions for Rationalizing Fair Game Forms à la Rawls and Sen

Reiko Goto, 玲子 後藤, レイコ ゴトウ, Kotaro Suzumura, 興太郎 鈴村, コウタロウ スズムラ, Naoki Yoshihara () and 直毅 吉原

No a455, Discussion Paper Series from Institute of Economic Research, Hitotsubashi University

Abstract: We examine the possibility of constructing social ordering functions, each of which associates a social ordering over the feasible pairs of allocations and allocation rules with each simple production economy. Three axioms on the admissible class of social ordering functions are introduced, which embody the values of procedural fairness, non-welfaristic egalitarianism, and welfaristic consequentialism, respectively. The logical compatibility of these axioms and their lexicographic combinations subject to constraints are examined. Two social ordering functions which give priority to procedural values rather than to consequential values are identified, which can uniformly rationalize a nice allocation rule in terms of the values of procedural fairness, non-welfaristic egalitarianism, and Pareto efficiency.

JEL-codes: D63 D71 I31 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 31 pages
Date: 2004-07
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-pke
Note: This Version June 2004, Bibliography: p. 27-29
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hit:hituec:a455

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