Endogenous Relationship Banking to Alleviate Excessive Screening in Transaction Banking

Yoshiaki Ogura, 義明 小倉 and ヨシアキ オグラ

No a487, Discussion Paper Series from Institute of Economic Research, Hitotsubashi University

Abstract: This paper analyzes how learning a borrower's creditworthiness, from past lending decision by a rival bank that is publicly observable through private or public credit reporting systems, affects the performance of subsequent lending competitions. Our analysis of twicerepeated lending competitions demonstrates that such ex post information sharing causes inefficient and excessive screening of new borrowers when banks undertake transaction banking since each bank expects future disadvantages to result from the information revelation. Relationship banking arises endogenously as a defense against such anticipated disadvantage, and improves the economic efficiency by alleviating the excessive screening.

Keywords: relationship banking; informational externality; interbank competition; commonvalue; repeated auction (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: G21 L14 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 44 pages
Date: 2006-12
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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