Bargaining Theory over Opportunity Assignments and the Egalitarian Solution

Yongsheng Xu, Naoki Yoshihara (), 直毅 吉原 and ナオキ ヨシハラ

No a517, Discussion Paper Series from Institute of Economic Research, Hitotsubashi University

Abstract: This paper discusses issues of axiomatic bargaining problems over opportunity assignments. The fair arbitrator uses the principle of "equal opportunity" for all players to make the recommendation on resource allocations. A framework in such a context is developed and the egalitarian solution to standard bargaining problems is reformulated and axiomatically characterized.

Keywords: Opportunity sets; bargaining over opportunity assignments; egalitarian solution (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C71 C78 D60 D63 D70 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 27 pages
Date: 2009-04
Note: First Version: December, 2005; This version: March 2009
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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https://hermes-ir.lib.hit-u.ac.jp/hermes/ir/re/17294/DP517.pdf

Related works:
Journal Article: Bargaining theory over opportunity assignments and the egalitarian solution (2022)
Working Paper: Bargaining theory over opportunity assignments and the egalitarian solution (2021)
Working Paper: Bargaining theory over opportunity assignments and the egalitarian solution (2021)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hit:hituec:a517

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