Divorce and Property Division Laws Shape Human Capital Investment

Peter Blair () and Elijah Neilson ()
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Peter Blair: Harvard Graduate School of Education
Elijah Neilson: Southern Utah University

No 2023-020, Working Papers from Human Capital and Economic Opportunity Working Group

Abstract: In theory, unilateral divorce laws alter the private incentive to invest in human capital by permitting either spouse to initiate the division of the marital assets. Using several causal research designs we show that both men and women are less likely to attain a bachelor’s degree in states with unilateral divorce laws—-especially individuals who were exposed to the laws when making educational choices and who live in states requiring an even split of assets upon divorce. Unilateral divorce laws do not distort human capital investment generically—but rather in contexts where the property division laws invite moral hazard.

Keywords: unilateral divorce; property rights; racial differences; labor market distortions (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D13 J12 J15 J16 J24 K11 K12 K36 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2023-08
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-law and nep-ltv
Note: MIP
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http://humcap.uchicago.edu/RePEc/hka/wpaper/Blair_ ... division-hum-cap.pdf First version, August 2023 (application/pdf)

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