Decentralized Targeting of Agricultural Credit Programs: Private versus Political Intermediaries

Pushkar Maitra, Sandip Mitra (), Dilip Mookherjee and Sujata Visaria ()
Additional contact information
Sandip Mitra: Sampling and Official Statistics Unit, Indian Statistical Institute
Sujata Visaria: Department of Economics, The Hong Kong University of Science and Technology
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Sujata Visaria and Sujata Visaria

No 202105, HKUST CEP Working Papers Series from HKUST Center for Economic Policy

Abstract: We conduct a field experiment in India comparing two approaches to appointing a local commission agent to select eligible smallholder farmers for a subsidized credit program: a private trader in TRAIL, versus a political appointee in GRAIL. Although both schemes had similar loan take-up and repayments and similar treatment impacts on borrowing and farm output, only TRAIL raised farm profits significantly. This cannot be explained by greater connectedness between TRAIL agents and farmers, or differential patterns of borrower selection. Instead, TRAIL agents increased their interactions with treated farmers, and we argue this helped them procure inputs at lower prices.

Keywords: Targeting; Intermediation; Decentralization; Community Driven Development; Agricultural Credit; Networks (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: H42 I38 O13 O16 O17 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2021-01
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-agr, nep-dev and nep-exp
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

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https://cep.hkust.edu.hk/sites/default/files/publi ... per/WP%202021-05.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Decentralized Targeting of Agricultural Credit Programs: Private Versus Political Intermediaries (2024)
Working Paper: Decentralized Targeting of Agricultural Credit Programs: Private versus Political Intermediaries (2021)
Working Paper: Decentralized Targeting of Agricultural Credit Programs: Private versus Political Intermediaries (2020)
Working Paper: Decentralized Targeting of Agricultural Credit Programs: Private versus Political Intermediaries (2020)
Working Paper: Decentralized Targeting of Agricultural Credit Programs: Private versus Political Intermediaries (2020)
Working Paper: Decentralized Targeting of Agricultural Credit Programs: Private versus Political Intermediaries (2020)
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