Credibility and Flexibility with Monetary Policy Committees

Ilian Mihov and Anne Sibert
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Anne Sibert: Birkbeck College, University of London

No 232002, Working Papers from Hong Kong Institute for Monetary Research

Abstract: We consider independent monetary policy committees as a simple way of attaining relatively low inflation without completely sacrificing an activist role of monetary policy. If central banker¡¦s types are unknown, then for a wide range of parameters an independent monetary policy committee is better than either a mandated zero-inflation rule or discretionary policy conducted by an opportunistic central banker.

JEL-codes: E42 E52 E58 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 25 pages
Date: 2002-12
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (7)

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Working Paper: Credibility and Flexibility with Monetary Policy Committees (2002)
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