Credibility and Flexibility with Monetary Policy Committees
Ilian Mihov () and
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Anne Sibert: Birkbeck College, University of London
No 232002, Working Papers from Hong Kong Institute for Monetary Research
We consider independent monetary policy committees as a simple way of attaining relatively low inflation without completely sacrificing an activist role of monetary policy. If central banker¡¦s types are unknown, then for a wide range of parameters an independent monetary policy committee is better than either a mandated zero-inflation rule or discretionary policy conducted by an opportunistic central banker.
JEL-codes: E42 E52 E58 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 25 pages
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Working Paper: Credibility and Flexibility with Monetary Policy Committees (2002)
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