Implementation of Social Choice Functions via Demanding Equilibria

Vincent Merlin () and Jörg Naeve

No 191/2000, Diskussionspapiere aus dem Institut für Volkswirtschaftslehre der Universität Hohenheim from Department of Economics, University of Hohenheim, Germany

Abstract: We consider agents who do not have any information about others' preferences. In this situation they attempt to behave such as to maximize their chances to obtain their most preferred alternative. This defines a solution concept for games symmetrical to Barbera and Dutta's protective equilibrium, the demanding equilibrium. Necessary and sufficient conditions for self implementation in demanding equilibria (side) of social choice functions are provided.

Keywords: Implementation; Social Choice Function; Demanding Equilibrium; Voting (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D71 D72 D81 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 24 pages
Date: 2000, Revised 2001-09-25
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm and nep-mic
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (5)

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