Equilibrium Convergence in Normal Form Games

Nicole Marie Bouchez and Daniel Friedman

No 00/2, Royal Holloway, University of London: Discussion Papers in Economics from Department of Economics, Royal Holloway University of London

Abstract: We examine convergence behavior in simple bimatrix games. We classify possible types of simple games, pick interesting examples of each type, and summarize convergence behavior under various information and player matching protocols.

Keywords: Normal Form Games; Convergence; Repeated Games. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 C73 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 12 pages
Date: 2001-02, Revised 2001-02
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Chapter: Equilibrium Convergence in Normal Form Games (2008)
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