Private vs. Public Regulation: Political Economy of the International Environment

Anthony Heyes and John Maxwell ()
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Anthony Heyes and John Maxwell: Department of Economics, Royal Holloway, University of London
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Anthony Giles Heyes and John W. Maxwell

No 03/5, Royal Holloway, University of London: Discussion Papers in Economics from Department of Economics, Royal Holloway University of London

Abstract: Minimum standards set by a ‘World Environmental Organisation’ (WEO) and NGO labelling are promoted as alternative approaches to international environmental protection. We explore the potential inter-play between these two approaches when the WEO is subject to pressure from producers. We find that if WEO and NGO schemes are mutually exclusive then the existence of an NGO ‘alternative’ increases industry resistance to WEO proposals and this may reduce welfare. If, however, the schemes are run in parallel, existence of the NGO lessens producer opposition to WEO activities. This allows the WEO to be ‘bolder’ in its proposals, which is good for welfare.

Keywords: Biodiversity; regulatory governance; instrument choice (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 36 pages
Date: 2003-12, Revised 2003-12
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-env, nep-pol, nep-reg and nep-res
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Journal Article: Private vs. public regulation: political economy of the international environment (2004)
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