Comparing Electoral Systems: A Geometric Analysis

Anouk Riviere

No 03/6, Royal Holloway, University of London: Discussion Papers in Economics from Department of Economics, Royal Holloway University of London

Abstract: This paper constructs a game-theoretic model of elections in alternative electoral systems with three or four candidates. Each electoral system specifies how the platforms of the candidates and their scores give rise to an outcome. When geometrical analysis shows that two outcomes can compete against each other for victory, a pivot probability is associated to that pair. Each voter is rational and picks the candidate that maximizes her expected utility, which results from the balancing of her preferences and beliefs about the pivot-probabilities. Candidate positioning is endogenous and the result of a Nash game. The possible equilibria are computed for plurality and runoff majority systems.

Keywords: electoral system; outcome simplex; strategic voting; pivot probability; positional equilibrium; runoff system; median voter theorem. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 35 pages
Date: 2003-12, Revised 2003-12
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm and nep-pol
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Journal Article: Comparing Electoral Systems: A Geometric Analysis (2004)
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