Escalating games, Co-ordination and dominance Solvability

Marco Mariotti

No 98/12, Royal Holloway, University of London: Discussion Papers in Economics from Department of Economics, Royal Holloway University of London

Abstract: Inspired by the model of Kalai and Satterthwaite (1994), I define a class of abstract games which are proved to be dominance-solvable. I show moreover that, in the leading subclass of co-ordination games, they are solvable on the unique Pareto-dominant outcome.

JEL-codes: C72 D43 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 11 pages
Date: 1998-02, Revised 1998-02
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