The Ambiguous Case for Letting Regulators Tailor Standards

Anthony Heyes

No 99/10, Royal Holloway, University of London: Discussion Papers in Economics from Department of Economics, Royal Holloway University of London

Abstract: Restrictions preventing regulators from setting standards on a firm by firm basis are commonly assumed to be inefficient. Existing rationales for their prevalence have been politico-economic. We provide an efficiency interpretation. We characterise settings in which the requirement that firms be treated equally is (a) definitely desirable (b) definitely undesirable and (c) where the case is ambiguous.

Keywords: Environmental; regulation; -; ratchet; effect; -; instrument; choice (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: L51 Q28 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: pages
Date: 2000-02, Revised 2000-02
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-reg
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