ALTRUISM

Joan Esteban ()

Working Papers from Instituto de Estudios Fiscales

Abstract: . In this paper we examine the vote over income tax schedules in a society in which individuals may have various degrees of altruism. Specifically, we study whether the conjecture that societies where individuals feel concern for each other are more favorable to income redistribution than societies made of egoistic individuales is true. In this respect, we set up a simple and plausible model in which altruistic individuals turn out to unanimously oppose tax increases.

References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.ief.es/documentos/recursos/publicaciones/papeles_trabajo/2002_31.pdf (application/pdf)
Our link check indicates that this URL is bad, the error code is: 500 Can't connect to www.ief.es:443 (Bad file descriptor) (http://www.ief.es/documentos/recursos/publicaciones/papeles_trabajo/2002_31.pdf [302 Moved Temporarily]--> https://www.ief.es/documentos/recursos/publicaciones/papeles_trabajo/2002_31.pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hpe:wpaper:y:2002:i:31

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Working Papers from Instituto de Estudios Fiscales Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Miguel Gómez de Antonio ().