The Political Market with Asymmetric Information and Hybrid Democracy

Liudmyla Vozna

No 13_2013, STOREPapers from Associazione Italiana per la Storia dell'Economia Politica - StorEP

Abstract: This article discusses why “the worst get on top” and the failure of democracy when the political market has distorted information flows. The political market here is examined during the electoral process, where voters become similar to employers on the labor market and “buy” the services of political work. The article goes to demonstrate that when politics becomes more commercialized, the asymmetry of information flow increases and the equilibrium of the political market is disturbed, eventually leading to the collapse of democratic institutions. The article also attempts to analyze the market with asymmetric information through the asymmetric positioning of supply and demand curves.

Keywords: political market; asymmetric information; democracy; excessive economization of policy; political rent (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D72 D82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 14 pages
Date: 2013-08
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://www.storep.org/wp/wp-content/uploads/2013/08/STEP-2013-13-Vozna.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hpo:wpaper:13_2013

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in STOREPapers from Associazione Italiana per la Storia dell'Economia Politica - StorEP Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Mario Aldo Cedrini ().