Neglected Risks, Financial Innovation, and Financial Fragility
Nicola Gennaioli,
Andrei Shleifer and
Robert Vishny
Scholarly Articles from Harvard University Department of Economics
Abstract:
We present a standard model of financial innovation, in which intermediaries engineer securities with cash flows that investors seek, but modify two assumptions. First, investors (and possibly intermediaries) neglect certain unlikely risks. Second, investors demand securities with safe cash flows. Financial intermediaries cater to these preferences and beliefs by engineering securities perceived to be safe but exposed to neglected risks. Because the risks are neglected, security issuance is excessive. As investors eventually recognize these risks, they fly back to the safety of traditional securities and markets become fragile, even without leverage, precisely because the volume of new claims is excessive.
Date: 2012
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (289)
Published in Journal of Financial Economics
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http://dash.harvard.edu/bitstream/handle/1/10886835/86973485.pdf (application/pdf)
Related works:
Journal Article: Neglected risks, financial innovation, and financial fragility (2012) 
Chapter: Neglected Risks, Financial Innovation, and Financial Fragility (2010)
Working Paper: Neglected Risks, Financial Innovation, and Financial Fragility (2010) 
Working Paper: Neglected Risks, Financial Innovation, and Financial Fragility (2010) 
Working Paper: Neglected risks, financial innovation and financial fragility (2010) 
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hrv:faseco:10886835
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