Efficient Kidney Exchange: Coincidence of Wants in a Markets with Compatibility-Based Preferences
M. Utku Ãœnver,
SÃ¶nmez, Tayfun and
Alvin Roth ()
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: M. Utku Ünver () and
Tayfun Sönmez ()
Scholarly Articles from Harvard University Department of Economics
Patients needing kidney transplants may have donors who cannot donate to them because of blood or tissue incompatibility. Incompatible patient-donor pairs can exchange donor kidneys with other pairs only when there is a â€œdouble coincidence of wants.â€ Developing infrastructure to perform three-way as well as two-way exchanges will have a substantial effect on the number of transplants that can be arranged. Larger than three-way exchanges have less impact on efficiency. In a general model of type-compatible exchanges, the size of the largest exchanges required to achieve efficiency equals the number of types.
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Published in American Economic Review
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Journal Article: Efficient Kidney Exchange: Coincidence of Wants in Markets with Compatibility-Based Preferences (2007)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hrv:faseco:2562809
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