Efficient Kidney Exchange: Coincidence of Wants in a Markets with Compatibility-Based Preferences

M. Utku Ünver, Sönmez, Tayfun and Alvin Roth
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Tayfun Sönmez and M. Utku Ünver

Scholarly Articles from Harvard University Department of Economics

Abstract: Patients needing kidney transplants may have donors who cannot donate to them because of blood or tissue incompatibility. Incompatible patient-donor pairs can exchange donor kidneys with other pairs only when there is a “double coincidence of wants.†Developing infrastructure to perform three-way as well as two-way exchanges will have a substantial effect on the number of transplants that can be arranged. Larger than three-way exchanges have less impact on efficiency. In a general model of type-compatible exchanges, the size of the largest exchanges required to achieve efficiency equals the number of types.

Date: 2007
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Published in American Economic Review

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Journal Article: Efficient Kidney Exchange: Coincidence of Wants in Markets with Compatibility-Based Preferences (2007)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hrv:faseco:2562809

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