Location choice in two-sided markets with indivisible agents

Robert M. Anderson, Glenn Ellison () and Drew Fudenberg

Scholarly Articles from Harvard University Department of Economics

Abstract: Consider a model of location choice by two sorts of agents, called “buyers†and “sellers†: In the first period agents simultaneously choose between two identical possible locations; following this, the agents at each location play some sort of game with the other agents there. Buyers prefer locations with fewer other buyers and more sellers, and sellers have the reverse preferences. We study the set of possible equilibrium sizes for the two markets, and show that two markets of very different sizes can co-exist even if larger markets are more efficient. This extends the analysis of Ellison and Fudenberg [2003. Quart. J. Econ. 118, 1249–1278], who ignored the constraint that the number of agents of each type in each market should be an integer, and instead analyzed the “quasi-equilibria†where agents are treated as infinitely divisible.

Date: 2010
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

Published in Games and Economic Behavior

Downloads: (external link)
http://dash.harvard.edu/bitstream/handle/1/27755298/31578966.pdf (application/pdf)
Our link check indicates that this URL is bad, the error code is: 404 Not found (http://dash.harvard.edu/bitstream/handle/1/27755298/31578966.pdf [301 Moved Permanently]--> https://dash.harvard.edu/bitstream/handle/1/27755298/31578966.pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Location choice in two-sided markets with indivisible agents (2010)
Working Paper: Location Choice in Two-Sided Markets with Indivisible Agents (2005)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hrv:faseco:27755298

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Scholarly Articles from Harvard University Department of Economics Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Office for Scholarly Communication ().