What Comes to Mind

Nicola Gennaioli and Andrei Shleifer

Scholarly Articles from Harvard University Department of Economics

Abstract: We present a model of judgment under uncertainty, in which an agent combines data received from the external world with information retrieved from memory to evaluate a hypothesis. We focus on what comes to mind immediately, as the agent makes quick, intuitive evaluations. Because the automatic retrieval of data from memory is both limited and selected, the agent's evaluations may be severely biased. This framework can account for some of the evidence on heuristics and biases presented by Kahneman and Tversky, including conjunction and disjunction fallacies.

Date: 2010
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (149)

Published in The Quarterly Journal of Economics

Downloads: (external link)
http://dash.harvard.edu/bitstream/handle/1/27867129/w15084.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: What Comes to Mind (2010)
Working Paper: What Comes to Mind (2009)
Working Paper: What comes to mind (2009)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hrv:faseco:27867129

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Scholarly Articles from Harvard University Department of Economics Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Office for Scholarly Communication ().