The Law and Economics of Self-dealing

Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes (), Simeon Djankov, Rafael La Porta and Andrei Shleifer

Scholarly Articles from Harvard University Department of Economics

Abstract: We present a new measure of legal protection of minority shareholders against expropriation by corporate insiders: the anti-self-dealing index. Assembled with the help of Lex Mundi law firms, the index is calculated for 72 countries based on legal rules prevailing in 2003, and focuses on private enforcement mechanisms, such as disclosure, approval, and litigation, that govern a specific self-dealing transaction. This theoretically grounded index predicts a variety of stock market outcomes, and generally works better than the previously introduced index of anti-director rights.

Date: 2008
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1168)

Published in Journal of Financial Economics

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http://dash.harvard.edu/bitstream/handle/1/2907526/selfdeal.may17.jfe.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: The law and economics of self-dealing (2008)
Working Paper: The Law and Economics of Self-Dealing (2005)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hrv:faseco:2907526

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