The Evolution of the Labor Market for Medical Interns and Residents: A Case Study in Game Theory

Alvin Roth

Scholarly Articles from Harvard University Department of Economics

Abstract: The organization of the labor market for medical interns and residents underwent a number of changes before taking its present form in 1951. The record of these changes and the problems that prompted them provides an unusual opportunity to study the forces at work in markets of this kind. The present paper begins with a brief history and then presents a game-theoretic analysis to explain the orderly operation and longevity of the current market, in contrast to the turmoil that characterized various earlier short-lived attempts to organize the market. An analysis is also given of some contemporary problems facing the market. A subsidiary theme of the paper concerns the history of ideas: the problems encountered in the organization of this market, and some of the solutions arrived at, anticipated the discussion of such issues in the literature of economics and game theory.

Date: 1984
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (469)

Published in Journal of Political Economy

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Journal Article: The Evolution of the Labor Market for Medical Interns and Residents: A Case Study in Game Theory (1984)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hrv:faseco:29410143

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