Why Beauty Matters
Markus Mobius () and
Scholarly Articles from Harvard University Department of Economics
We decompose the beauty premium in an experimental labor market where â€œemployersâ€ determine wages of â€œworkersâ€ who perform a maze-solving task. This task requires a true skill which we show to be unaffected by physical attractiveness. We find a sizable beauty premium and can identify three transmission channels: (a) physically attractive workers are more confident and higher confidence increases wages; (b) for a given level of confidence, physically attractive workers are (wrongly) considered more able by employers; (c) controlling for worker confidence, physically attractive workers have oral skills (such as communication and social skills) that raise their wages when they interact with employers. Our methodology can be adopted to study the sources of discriminatory pay differentials in other settings.
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Published in American Economic Review
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Working Paper: Why Beauty Matters (2010)
Journal Article: Why Beauty Matters (2006)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hrv:faseco:3043406
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