Existence of Equilibrium in Large Double Auctions

Drew Fudenberg, Markus Mobius () and Adam Szeidl

Scholarly Articles from Harvard University Department of Economics

Abstract: We show the existence of a pure strategy, symmetric, increasing equilibrium in dou- ble auction markets with correlated, conditionally independent private values and many participants. The equilibrium we ï¬ nd is arbitrarily close to fully revealing as the market size grows. Our results provide strategic foundations for price-taking behavior in large markets.

Date: 2007
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Published in Journal of Economic Theory

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Related works:
Working Paper: Existence of Equilibrium in Large Double Auctions (2010)
Journal Article: Existence of equilibrium in large double auctions (2007)
Working Paper: Existence of Equilibrium in Large Double Auctions (2004)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hrv:faseco:3043420

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