Random Matching in Adaptive Dynamics

Lorens Imhof, Glenn Ellison () and Drew Fudenberg

Scholarly Articles from Harvard University Department of Economics

Abstract: This paper studies the effect of randomness in per-period matching on the long-run outcome of non-equilibrium adaptive processes. If there are many matchings between each strategy revision, the randomness due to matching will be small; our question is when a very small noise due to matching has a negligible effect. We study two different senses of this idea, and provide sufficient conditions for each. The less demanding sense corresponds to sending the matching noise to zero while holding fixed all other aspects of the adaptive process. The second sense in which matching noise can be negligible is that it does not alter the limit distribution obtained as the limit of the invariant distributions as an exogenous “mutation rate†goes to zero.

Date: 2009
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

Published in Games and Economic Behavior

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Related works:
Journal Article: Random matching in adaptive dynamics (2009)
Working Paper: Random matching in adaptive dynamics (2007)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hrv:faseco:3190371

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