Superstition and Rational Learning

David Levine and Drew Fudenberg

Scholarly Articles from Harvard University Department of Economics

Abstract: We argue that some, but not all, superstitions can persist when learning is rational and players are patient, and illustrate our argument with an example inspired by the Code of Hammurabi. The code specified an “appeal by surviving in the river†as a way of deciding whether an accusation was true. According to our theory, a mechanism that uses superstitions two or more steps off the equilibrium path, such as “appeal by surviving in the river,†is more likely to persist than a superstition where the false beliefs are only one step off the equilibrium path.

Date: 2006
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (41)

Published in American Economic Review

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Related works:
Journal Article: Superstition and Rational Learning (2006)
Working Paper: Superstition and Rational Learning (2006)
Working Paper: Superstition and Rational Learning (2005)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hrv:faseco:3196330

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