Consistency and Cautious Fictitious Play

Drew Fudenberg and David Levine

Scholarly Articles from Harvard University Department of Economics

Abstract: We study a variation of fictitious play, in which the probability of each action is an exponential function of that action's utility against the historical frequency of opponents' play. Regardless of the opponents' strategies, the utility received by an agent using this rule is nearly the best that could be achieved against the historical frequency. Such rules are approximately optimal in i.i.d. environments, and guarantee nearly the minmax regardless of opponents' behavior. Fictitious play shares these properties provided it switches 'infrequently' between actions. We also study the long-run outcomes when all players use consistent and cautious rules.

Date: 1995
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (115)

Published in Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control

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Related works:
Working Paper: Consistency and Cautious Fictitious Play (1996)
Journal Article: Consistency and cautious fictitious play (1995)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hrv:faseco:3198694

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