Subjective Uncertainty Over Behavior Strategies: A Correction

David Levine, Eddie Dekel and Drew Fudenberg

Scholarly Articles from Harvard University Department of Economics

Abstract: In order to model the subjective uncertainty of a player over the behavior strategies of an opponent, one must consider the player's beliefs about the opponent's play at information sets that the player thinks have probability zero. This corregendum uses “trembles†to provide a definition of the convex hull of a set of behavior strategies. This corrects a definition we gave in [E. Dekel, D. Fudenberg, and D. K. Levine, 1999, J. Econ. Theory 89, 165–185], which led to two of the solution concepts we defined there not having the properties we intended.

Date: 2002
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Published in Journal of Economic Theory

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Journal Article: Subjective Uncertainty over Behavior Strategies: A Correction (2002)
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