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Bilateral Contracts

Jerry Green and Seppo Honkapohja ()

Scholarly Articles from Harvard University Department of Economics

Abstract: A mathematical characterization of self-enforcing bilateral contracts is given. Contracts where both parties exercise some control over the quantity traded can sometimes be superior to contracts that rest control entirely with one side. Some qualitative characteristics of these contracts are given.

Date: 1983
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Published in Journal of Mathematical Economics

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Journal Article: Bilateral contracts (1983) Downloads
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hrv:faseco:3204671

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